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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for forcible sexual
abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 765-404 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge,
presiding.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ALFRED L. RANGEL,

Case No. 920802-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 615, Utah Rules of Evidence, as amended effective
April 29, 1991, provides (in redlined form):
Rule 615.

Exclusion of witnesses.

{1} At the request of a party the court shall order
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony
of other witnesses, and it may make the order on its own
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of:
-fl-)-(a) a party who is a natural person-?—e*f§
42-Mb)
an officer or employee of a party
which is not a natural person designated as its
representative by its attorney-?—eaffl
43-K{c) a person whose presence is shown by a
party to be essential to the presentation of his
cause? or
(d) an -adult victim in & criminal trial whers
the prosecutor agrees with the victim's presence•
{2} The court may exclude or excuse a victim from
the courtroom if he becomes disruptive*
{3} An. adult victim in a critftinal trial who elects
to be present in the courtroom may not be prevented from
"testifying, even after being pre&ent and having heard
other testimony.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in

cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without
just
compensation.

The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution, section 1 provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.

Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property , without due process of law.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-4 (1992) provides:
78-7-4.

Right to exclude in certain cases.

In an action of divorce, criminal conversation,
seduction, abortion, rape, or assault with intent to
commit rape, the court may, in its discretion, exclude
all persons who are not directly interested therein,
except jurors, witnesses and officers of the court; and
in any cause the court may, in its discretion, during the
examination of a witness exclude any and all other
witnesses in the cause.
2

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ALL ISSUES RAISED ON THIS APPEAL WERE
PRESERVED BELOW.
(Responding to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
The State argues that trial counsel's repeated objections
to the presence of the victim at trial during the testimony of
other witnesses were insufficient to preserve the issues of due
process and unconstitutionality for appeal.
at Point I, pp. 14-21.

See Brief of Appellee

The State ignores the purpose of the waiver

doctrine, and overstates its breadth:
The requirement of a specific objection on the record
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of
the objections and have an opportunity to correct any
errors before the case goes to the jury. E.g. , State v.
Kazda, 545 P. 2d 190, 192-3 (Utah 1976) . This requirement
also assures that the appellate court will have a record
of the grounds asserted below. If, however, the record
on appeal fails to demonstrate that the trial court has
been given a fair opportunity to avoid an error, we
usually will not consider any claim based on that error.
E.g. , Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) .
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988).
[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged error
must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial
court. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial
court to correct any error, if error there be.
Utah

County v.

Brown,

672

P.2d

83, 85

(Utah

1983)

(footnote

omitted).
A timely and recorded objection to the trial
court's failure to comply with a request at trial puts
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allows the
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of
the proceeding.
. . .
There is no support for
appellant's claim that the trial judge knew the action he
was requested to take but refused to take it.
Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989).
3

In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in
issue at the trial may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754,
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co.,
659 P.2d 1040, 1044
(Utah 1983).
A matter is
sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial
court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make
findings of fact or law. See Turtle Management, Inc. v.
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) .
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) .

See also

State v. Johnson, No. 900268, slip op. at 2 (Utah July 16, 1993)
("A defendant is obliged to seek a trial court's ruling on an issue
before the issue can be raised in an appellate court.11) ; Lamkin v.
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1979) ("This point is raised for the
first time on appeal and hence was not ruled upon by the trial
court.");

Wurst v. Dep't of Employment Sec,

(Utah App. 1991)

818 P.2d 1036, 1039

(issue sufficiently raised where mentioned in

letter to department which served as appeal of A.L.J.'s decision).
In this case, all the purposes of the contemporaneous
objection rule have been served.

The trial court was apprised of

the asserted error, given an opportunity to rule, and did in fact
rule.

The constitutionality of the amendments to Rule 615 was not

raised for the first time on appeal, without an opportunity for the
trial court to address the issue.
Defense counsel stated, "I have a continuing objection to
the victim being allowed to stay in the courtroom.

I've got that

matter up on appeal now, but I think on the record I need to make
an objection."

R. 69-70.

This statement fully apprised the trial

court of the contested matter.
length, but are obvious.

The grounds were not spelled out at

Defense counsel cite due process and
4

unconstitutionality almost as frequently as the State is heard to
assert waiver.
The trial court knew what was requested of him, but
declined to find the statute unconstitutional.
. deny the motion with respect to the victim.

He ruled.

"I'll

The victim may

remain." Later, after a renewed objection specifically addressing
allowing the victim to remain through opening arguments, the court
again ruled:

"The Rule provides for the victim -- the adult victim

to be present; accordingly, she may remain." R. 82-3. The matter
must now be conclusively resolved on appeal.
Similarly, with respect to the prosecutor's improper
question to the victim during opening arguments, defense counsel
immediately objected.

R. 83. No waiver has occurred.

POINT 11.
THIS COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED BY ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE, RULE, OR
CASE
LAW
FROM
DETERMINING
THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH STATUTES.
(Responding to Point II of Appellee's Brief)
With no supporting authority whatsoever, the State baldly
asserts that the Utah Court of Appeals is not empowered to declare
Utah statutory provisions unconstitutional. Article VIII, section
2 of the Utah Constitution only addresses the standard to be used
by the Supreme Court for declaring a statute unconstitutional. No
similar constitutional provision addresses what standards must be
used by district courts or the Court of Appeals in declaring a
statute unconstitutional.

5

Absent some requirement that the Court of Appeals sit en
banc

to address statutory constitutionality, its inability to do so

is irrelevant.

Despite the State's assertions to the contrary,

this Court doesn't need to sit en banc.

Three judge panels are

fully adequate to address these questions.

If the Court of Appeals

finds a statute unconstitutional, upon subsequent review by the
Supreme Court (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g) (Supp. 1993)) it
can only find the statute unconstitutional upon a concurrence of a
majority of its members, per Article VIII, section 2.
As the State points out, "Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g)
([Supp.] 199 [3]) vests the Utah Supreme Court with jurisdiction
over a judgment of 'any court of record holding a statute . . .
unconstitutional on its face . . . . ' " Brief of Appellee at p. 22.
By necessary implication, some court of record must be able to
declare a statute unconstitutional.
since

the

Court

of

Appeals

is

By the State's reasoning,

unable

to

declare

statutes

unconstitutional, such decisions must come from district courts or
other lower courts. Upon such a determination, appeal to the Court
of Appeals in criminal cases (as required for all but first degree
and capital felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp.
1993)) would be meaningless:

the State contends that the Court of

Appeals would be unable to affirm.

An automatic reversal would

result, and the matter would have to be taken up on certiorari for
its

first

(if

any) 1 appellate

determination

on

the

merits.

HJnlike an appeal from a Court of Appeals determination of
facial unconstitutionality, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g)
(Supp. 1993), appeal from a finding of constitutionality would be
6

Alternatively, if four Court of Appeals judges concur (see Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1993)), the matter may be certified
to the Supreme Court.

This result was neither intended by the

legislature, nor does it make any logical or jurisprudential sense.
The State's basic premise is wrong.

This Court CAN declare

statutes unconstitutional.
The

State

further

argues, without

citation

to any

authority whatsoever, that it would not be collaterally estopped
from re-litigating the constitutionality of a statute declared
unconstitutional

by the Court of Appeals:

"However, unless

certiorari were granted under rule 46,[2] Utah Rule [s] of Appellate
Procedure, and the panel ruling upheld, the question of the
statute's constitutionality might be subject to re-litigation in
subsequent

cases:

that

is, there

estoppel,' or issue preclusion."
State is wrong.
2(3) (g).

would

be

no

'collateral

Brief of Appellee at 23.

The

Review will occur in all cases under § 78-2-

If affirmed by the Supreme Court, the State would be

collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue.
Issue preclusion

is applicable where

(i) the issue

decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the issue in
the instant litigation; (ii) there was a final decision on the

by certiorari only.
the Supreme Court.

Certiorari is, of course, discretionary with

2

The State inexplicably ignores the operation of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (g) (Supp. 1993). Where direct appeal as of right
is provided, as in all cases where the Court of Appeals declares a
statute facially unconstitutional, resort to certiorari is
unnecessary.
7

merits; (iii) the party against whom collateral estoppel is pled
was

a party

to

or

in privity

with

a party

to

the

prior

adjudication; and (iv) was the issue competently, fully, and fairly
litigated.

Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978).

All the criteria would apply to any attempt by the State to
re-litigate the constitutionality of a statute.3
Implicit in the State's position is the premise that
decisions of the Court of Appeals have no precedential value or
stare

decisis

effect. This preposterous assertion is belied by the

State's citation to no less than nine Court of Appeals decisions in
its brief.
It is recognized under the doctrine of stare decisis
that, once a point of law has been established by a
court, that point of law will generally be followed by
the same court and all courts of lower rank in subsequent
cases where the same legal issue is raised.
Stare
decisis operates to promote system-wide stability and
continuity by ensuring the survival of decisions that
have been previously approved by a court.
Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., 789 P.2d 541, 554 (Kan. 1990) .
Lest there be any doubt that the doctrine of stare

decisis

is

applicable to decisions of the Court of Appeals, the Court is
referred to State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)
(discussing in dicta the stare decisis

effect of a decision of the

Court of Appeals on other panels of the Court of Appeals).
The Court of Appeals has addressed the constitutionality
of statutes in prior cases. In State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah

theoretically, the State could argue their own incompetence,
but this ploy should be rejected if the State is ever brazen enough
to utilize it.
8

App. 1990), a panel of the Court of Appeals

(per Jackson, J.,

Greenwood, J., concurring, and Bench, J., dissenting) declared that
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(3) (1986) and § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988)
were unconstitutional as violative of article VI, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution.4
same power

This panel of the Court of Appeals has the

to declare

the

1991 amendments

to Rule

615 to be

unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION
This Court should rule that the 1991 amendments to Rule
615 are unconstitutional, both on their face and as applied to Mr.
Range1.

The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to

sequester the victim in this case.
Mr. Rangel is entitled to an order of reversal with
directions to enter a judgment of acquittal.

At a minimum, Mr.

Rangel is entitled to a new trial.

4

See also State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 (Utah App. 1992)
(this Court declined to decide whether a loitering statute was
constitutional, finding that good faith reliance on the validity of
the statute was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion;
nowhere does the opinion indicate the Court of Appeals does not
have the authority to declare statutes unconstitutional.
9

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2&

K
day of July, 1993

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JAMES A. VALDEZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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